Key-Value Store - Security and Privacy
Authentication and Authorization
Authentication Mechanisms
1. API Key Authentication:
- Static API keys per client
- Stored in secure key management service
- Rotated every 90 days
- Rate limited per key
Example:
GET /api/v1/keys/user:123
Authorization: Bearer sk_live_abc123xyz789
2. OAuth 2.0:
- Token-based authentication
- Short-lived access tokens (1 hour)
- Refresh tokens for renewal
- Scope-based permissions
Flow:
Client → Auth Server: Request token
Auth Server → Client: Access token
Client → KV Store: Request with token
KV Store → Auth Server: Validate token
KV Store → Client: Response
3. Mutual TLS (mTLS):
- Certificate-based authentication
- Both client and server verify certificates
- Strong cryptographic identity
- No password management
4. IAM Role-Based:
- Cloud provider IAM integration
- Temporary credentials
- Fine-grained permissions
- Audit trailAuthorization Models
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC):
Roles:
- Admin: Full access to all operations
- Writer: Read and write access
- Reader: Read-only access
- Auditor: Read metadata only
Example:
User: john@example.com
Role: Writer
Permissions:
- GET /keys/*
- PUT /keys/*
- DELETE /keys/*
- ❌ POST /admin/*
Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC):
Policies:
- Allow if user.department == resource.department
- Allow if user.clearance >= resource.classification
- Allow if time.hour >= 9 AND time.hour <= 17
Example:
User: {department: "engineering", clearance: "secret"}
Resource: {department: "engineering", classification: "confidential"}
Result: ALLOW (clearance >= classification)
Key-Level Permissions:
- Per-key access control lists (ACLs)
- Owner, group, and public permissions
- Unix-style permissions (rwx)
Example:
Key: "user:123:profile"
Owner: user:123 (rwx)
Group: admins (r-x)
Public: (---)Data Encryption
Encryption at Rest
Storage Encryption:
- AES-256 encryption for all data
- Encrypted SSTables on disk
- Encrypted WAL files
- Encrypted backups
Key Management:
- Master key stored in HSM or KMS
- Data encryption keys (DEKs) per SSTable
- Key rotation every 90 days
- Envelope encryption pattern
Encryption Flow:
1. Generate DEK for new SSTable
2. Encrypt SSTable with DEK
3. Encrypt DEK with master key
4. Store encrypted DEK with SSTable
5. On read: Decrypt DEK, decrypt data
Example:
Master Key (in KMS): mk_abc123
Data Encryption Key: dek_xyz789
Write:
plaintext → AES-256(plaintext, dek_xyz789) → ciphertext
dek_xyz789 → AES-256(dek_xyz789, mk_abc123) → encrypted_dek
Store: ciphertext + encrypted_dek
Read:
encrypted_dek → AES-256-decrypt(encrypted_dek, mk_abc123) → dek_xyz789
ciphertext → AES-256-decrypt(ciphertext, dek_xyz789) → plaintextEncryption in Transit
TLS 1.3 Configuration:
- Minimum TLS 1.2, prefer TLS 1.3
- Strong cipher suites only
- Perfect forward secrecy (PFS)
- Certificate pinning for clients
Cipher Suites:
- TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
- TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
- TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
Certificate Management:
- Automated certificate rotation
- Let's Encrypt or internal CA
- Certificate expiry monitoring
- Revocation checking (OCSP)
Inter-Node Communication:
- Mutual TLS (mTLS) required
- Certificate-based authentication
- Encrypted replication traffic
- Encrypted gossip protocolClient-Side Encryption
Application-Level Encryption:
- Encrypt data before sending to store
- Store only ciphertext
- Decrypt after retrieval
- Zero-knowledge architecture
Example:
Client Side:
plaintext = "sensitive data"
key = client_encryption_key
ciphertext = AES-256(plaintext, key)
PUT /keys/user:123
Body: ciphertext
Server Side:
- Stores ciphertext (can't decrypt)
- No access to encryption key
- Zero knowledge of plaintext
Benefits:
✅ Server can't read data
✅ Protection against server compromise
✅ Compliance with regulations
Challenges:
❌ No server-side operations (search, filter)
❌ Key management complexity
❌ Performance overheadAccess Control and Auditing
Audit Logging
Audit Log Schema:
{
"timestamp": "2024-01-08T12:00:00Z",
"request_id": "req_abc123",
"user_id": "user:123",
"client_ip": "192.168.1.100",
"operation": "GET",
"resource": "/keys/user:456",
"status": "SUCCESS",
"latency_ms": 5,
"user_agent": "KV-Client/1.0",
"auth_method": "API_KEY",
"data_accessed": {
"key": "user:456",
"size_bytes": 1024
}
}
Logged Events:
- All read operations
- All write operations
- All delete operations
- Authentication attempts
- Authorization failures
- Admin operations
- Configuration changes
Storage:
- Immutable append-only log
- Stored in separate audit database
- Retained for 7 years (compliance)
- Encrypted at rest
- Tamper-proof (cryptographic hashing)Access Patterns Monitoring
Anomaly Detection:
- Unusual access patterns
- High-volume requests
- Off-hours access
- Geographic anomalies
- Failed authentication attempts
Alerts:
- >100 failed auth attempts in 5 minutes
- Access from new geographic location
- Bulk data export (>10K keys)
- Admin operations outside business hours
- Privilege escalation attempts
Example Alert:
Alert: Suspicious Access Pattern
User: john@example.com
Pattern: 10,000 keys accessed in 1 minute
Location: New York (usual: San Francisco)
Time: 2:00 AM (unusual)
Action: Temporarily suspend account, notify security teamData Privacy and Compliance
GDPR Compliance
Right to Access:
- API endpoint to retrieve all user data
- Export in machine-readable format (JSON)
- Include metadata and audit logs
Example:
GET /api/v1/privacy/export?user_id=user:123
Response: {
"user_data": {...},
"metadata": {...},
"audit_logs": [...]
}
Right to Erasure (Right to be Forgotten):
- API endpoint to delete all user data
- Cascade delete across all replicas
- Remove from backups (or anonymize)
- Audit trail of deletion
Example:
DELETE /api/v1/privacy/erase?user_id=user:123
Process:
1. Identify all keys for user
2. Delete from all replicas
3. Mark for deletion in backups
4. Log deletion event
5. Confirm completion
Right to Rectification:
- API endpoint to update user data
- Propagate updates to all replicas
- Audit trail of changes
Data Minimization:
- Store only necessary data
- Automatic data expiration (TTL)
- Anonymize old data
- Aggregate instead of raw dataData Residency
Geographic Data Placement:
- Store EU user data in EU region
- Store US user data in US region
- Prevent cross-border replication
Implementation:
- Partition by user location
- Region-specific clusters
- Routing based on user location
- Compliance metadata per key
Example:
User: john@example.com (EU resident)
Data: Stored in eu-west-1 cluster
Replication: Only within EU region
Compliance: GDPR, EU data residency laws
Enforcement:
- Metadata tag: {"region": "EU", "residency": "required"}
- Replication policy: EU-only
- Access control: Block non-EU access
- Audit: Log all access attemptsPII Handling
PII Detection:
- Automatic detection of PII fields
- Email addresses, phone numbers, SSN
- Credit card numbers, addresses
- Machine learning-based detection
PII Protection:
- Encrypt PII fields separately
- Tokenization for sensitive data
- Masking in logs and monitoring
- Access control for PII
Example:
Key: "user:123:profile"
Value: {
"name": "John Doe", // PII
"email": "john@example.com", // PII
"age": 30, // Not PII
"preferences": {...} // Not PII
}
Storage:
"name": encrypt("John Doe")
"email": tokenize("john@example.com") → "token_abc123"
"age": 30
"preferences": {...}
Logs:
"Accessed user:123:profile" (no PII in logs)
"Email: j***@example.com" (masked)Network Security
DDoS Protection
Rate Limiting:
- Per-client rate limits
- Per-IP rate limits
- Adaptive rate limiting
- Token bucket algorithm
Example:
Client: api_key_abc123
Limit: 10,000 requests/minute
Burst: 1,000 requests/second
If exceeded:
- Return 429 Too Many Requests
- Exponential backoff required
- Temporary ban after repeated violations
Traffic Filtering:
- Geo-blocking for suspicious regions
- IP blacklisting
- User-agent filtering
- Request size limits
Load Balancing:
- Distribute traffic across nodes
- Health checks and failover
- Connection limits per node
- Circuit breakersFirewall and Network Segmentation
Network Architecture:
┌─────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Public Internet │
└─────────────────┬───────────────────────┘
│
┌─────────────────▼───────────────────────┐
│ Load Balancer (WAF enabled) │
└─────────────────┬───────────────────────┘
│
┌─────────────────▼───────────────────────┐
│ DMZ (API Gateway) │
│ - TLS termination │
│ - Authentication │
│ - Rate limiting │
└─────────────────┬───────────────────────┘
│
┌─────────────────▼───────────────────────┐
│ Private Network (KV Store Nodes) │
│ - No public internet access │
│ - mTLS for inter-node comm │
│ - Encrypted replication │
└─────────────────────────────────────────┘
Firewall Rules:
- Allow: HTTPS (443) from internet to load balancer
- Allow: Internal traffic between KV nodes
- Deny: All other traffic
- Log: All denied connectionsIncident Response
Security Incident Handling
Incident Response Plan:
1. Detection:
- Automated alerts
- Anomaly detection
- User reports
- Security scanning
2. Containment:
- Isolate affected nodes
- Revoke compromised credentials
- Block malicious IPs
- Enable additional logging
3. Investigation:
- Analyze audit logs
- Identify scope of breach
- Determine root cause
- Collect evidence
4. Remediation:
- Patch vulnerabilities
- Rotate credentials
- Update firewall rules
- Restore from backups if needed
5. Recovery:
- Bring systems back online
- Verify security posture
- Monitor for recurrence
- Update documentation
6. Post-Incident:
- Incident report
- Lessons learned
- Update procedures
- Notify affected users (if required)Backup and Disaster Recovery
Backup Strategy:
- Incremental backups every hour
- Full backups daily
- Encrypted backups
- Cross-region replication
- Immutable backups (WORM)
Recovery Procedures:
- Point-in-time recovery
- Automated recovery testing
- RTO: <1 hour
- RPO: <5 minutes
Security Considerations:
- Encrypted backups
- Access control for backups
- Audit trail for backup access
- Regular recovery drillsThis comprehensive security and privacy guide ensures the distributed key-value store meets enterprise security requirements and regulatory compliance standards.